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To optimize the environmental performance and the conflicting economic interests of the 18 
stakeholders that interact within circular integrated waste management systems (CIWMSs), life 19 
cycle analysis and game theoretical models – based on the Stackelberg equilibrium – were 20 
integrated into a multi-objective optimization framework. The framework was used to determine 21 
the operational decisions and the configuration of a CIWMS that simultaneously minimize the total 22 
global warming impacts (GWI) and maximize the profits of i) the waste managers that valorize the 23 
municipal organic waste generated in the Spanish region of Cantabria, and ii) the regional farmers 24 
that purchase the organic fertilizers derived from this waste. The resulting bilevel problem was 25 
solved applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The balance between the stakeholders’ 26 
objectives is reflected in the low prices set for the organic fertilizers (0-2 €·metric ton-1 of compost, 27 
and 0-1 €·metric ton-1 of digestate). Although the minimal GWI are constrained by the waste 28 
managers’ profits, it is possible to push the Pareto frontier toward better outcomes increasing the 29 
waste management taxes. The proposed framework proved to be a useful instrument to plan for a 30 
sustainable circular economy, warranting that the production and purchase of organic fertilizers is 31 
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The economic sector that encompasses agriculture, forestry and other land uses emits almost a 46 
quarter of the anthropogenic greenhouse gases.1 The nitrogen use efficiency of the most cultivated 47 
crops is typically below 40%; the remaining nitrogen is released to the atmosphere as N2O – a 48 
powerful greenhouse gas – or leaches into the water bodies causing eutrophication.2 Moreover, 49 
around 45% of the phosphorus mined worldwide for agricultural purposes ends in the ocean, 50 
contributing to eutrophication and the depletion of this non-renewable nutrient.3 51 
 52 
On the other hand, solid waste management accounts for about 5% of global warming impacts 53 
(GWI).4 The diversion of organic waste from landfills prevents the degradation of carbon into CH4 – 54 
a significant contributor to global warming – that occurs under the anaerobic conditions of landfills, 55 
and represents an opportunity for nutrient recovery; it has been estimated that the total nitrogen, 56 
phosphorus and potassium contained in food, animal and human waste amount to 2.7 times the 57 
nutrients processed by the fertilizer industry.5  58 
 59 
Finding a common strategy to meet the ever-increasing demand for nutrients and manage organic 60 
waste while minimizing the associated environmental impacts and the removal of resources from 61 
the environment falls within the scope of a circular economic system. However, a standardized 62 
systematic approach to quantify, assess and optimize the performance of a circular economy is still 63 
lacking. 64 
      65 
Cobo et al.6,7 illustrated how process systems engineering can effectively assist decision-makers in 66 
this respect by developing a life cycle optimization framework for the sustainable design of Circular 67 
Integrated Waste Management Systems (CIWMSs) targeting nutrient circularity. Nonetheless, their 68 
study did not consider that an increase in the market share of the fertilizing products recovered 69 
from organic waste (hereafter referred to as organic fertilizers) can only be achieved if farmers are 70 
willing to purchase these products. 71 
 72 
Indeed, the worse performance of organic fertilizers compared with industrial fertilizers – more 73 
product is required to fertilize the same area –8,9 renders them uncompetitive in the absence of 74 
subsidies. To avert a scenario where waste managers do not get back a return on the investment 75 
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made in sustainable technologies and accumulate a stock of organic fertilizers that cannot be sold, 76 
trade-offs between their economic interests and those of the farmers must be made. Therefore, 77 
modeling the farmers’ response to the prices set for the organic fertilizers is critical to accurately 78 
foresee the behavior of CIWMSs.  79 
 80 
Game theory can be applied to optimize the decisions and actions of all the parties involved in a 81 
circular supply chain in accordance with their individual – and conflicting – objectives. Nevertheless, 82 
few studies have reportedly approached the design of circular systems from a game theoretical 83 
perspective. Some authors have analyzed the payoff matrices derived from the alternative decisions 84 
that the relevant actors within circular systems can make,10-13 whereas others have developed more 85 
complex optimization frameworks.14-16 To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the optimization of 86 
the interactions between the waste managers that valorize municipal organic waste and the farmers 87 
that purchase the resulting fertilizing products has not been described in the literature.  88 
 89 
Thus, the goal of this paper is to explore how game theory optimization can be used to plan for the 90 
implementation of a sustainable circular economy of nutrients by guaranteeing that the production 91 
and agricultural application of organic fertilizers is profitable for both ends of the supply chain. This 92 
research builds on previous studies that focus on a CIWMS aimed at the valorization of the municipal 93 
organic waste generated in the Spanish region of Cantabria.7-9 The results of the study will determine 94 
the operational decisions and the configuration of the Cantabrian CIWMS that minimize its GWI and 95 
optimize the economic performance of the involved stakeholders. Specifically, the research will 96 
reveal the types of organic fertilizers that must be produced and the range of prices that should be 97 





The integration of life cycle and game theoretical models underpinned the holistic and decentralized 103 
optimization of the system. The assumptions made and the methodological procedure followed are 104 
described below.   105 
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System model 106 
 107 
Figure 1 depicts the superstructure containing all the alternative unit processes that could be 108 
integrated into the optimal system design. Once the unit processes were separately characterized, 109 
the system model was constructed in the GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) 28.2.0 110 
optimization platform.17 111 
 112 
To align this modular modeling approach with the game theoretical model that describes the 113 
stakeholders’ behavior, the unit processes were split into two subsystems comprising the activities 114 
of different groups of agents: the waste management and the agricultural subsystems. The 115 
boundaries that delimit the studied CIWMS and the two subsystems are identified in Figure 1.  116 
 117 
Regarding the spatiotemporal boundaries of the study, the CIWMS processes the municipal organic 118 
waste collected from all the Cantabrian municipalities in one year (83,544 metric ton).18 The 119 
farmers, who purchase the amount of fertilizing products required to grow their crops during that 120 
year, are located across the region.  121 
 122 
 123 
- Life cycle model 124 
 125 
An attributional Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) model (based on average data and focusing on the 126 
environmentally relevant flows that enter and exit the system)19 was developed. The functional unit 127 
was defined as the area that must be annually fertilized to meet the nutrient requirements of the 128 
two most cultivated crops in Cantabria – corn and wheat –, which in 2018 occupied 4,118 and 674 129 
ha, respectively.20 The analyzed CIWMS also supplies the electricity generated at the incineration, 130 
landfill and anaerobic digestion unit processes. To address the system multi-functionality, the direct 131 
substitution method was applied, presuming that the electricity generated by the CIWMS replaces 132 
the same amount of electricity produced with the average Spanish technology mix.  133 
 134 
The GWI were modeled with the ReCiPe 1.11 method,21 considering a 100-year time horizon. The 135 
biogenic carbon derived from food waste was quantified as neutral; i.e., it was assumed to have 136 






















Figure 1. System boundaries and superstructure 157 
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The LCA of the individual unit processes that compose the system was carried out with the 158 
EASETECH (Environmental Assessment System for Environmental Technologies) 2.3.6 software.22 159 
EASETECH also calculated the composition and flows of the streams exiting each unit process, which 160 
served as the input data to the models of the units that further process those streams. The DNDC 161 
(Denitrification-Decomposition) 9.5 simulation model23 was used to predict the mean annual 162 
fertilization requirements, crop yields, and carbon and nitrogen emissions due to the application of 163 
the different fertilizers to the soil in the 100-year timeframe. The DNDC results were transferred to 164 
EASETECH to determine the associated GWI. The data required to conduct the LCA, namely the 165 
waste composition (Appendix A), the life cycle inventories of the waste management unit processes 166 
(Appendix B), and the DNDC input data and results (Appendix C) are in the Supporting Information.  167 
 168 
Life Cycle Costing was used to determine the stakeholders’ profits. The economic models of the 169 
waste management unit processes were mainly derived from SWOLF (Solid Waste Optimization 170 
Lifecycle Framework),24 whereas various sources provided the data to estimate the farmers’ 171 
profits.25-31 The selected reference year for the economic data related to the waste management 172 
and the agricultural subsystems (Appendix D) is 2015.  173 
 174 
It was assumed that the waste managers are free to fix a gate price for the compost and digestate 175 
between -10 and 10 €·metric ton-1. It is not unusual for European waste managers to pay for the 176 
transportation and spreading costs of the organic fertilizers;32,33 even negative prices have been 177 
reported as a measure to incentivize farmers to purchase organic fertilizers.34 The same minimum 178 
gate prices were considered for the struvite and (NH4)2SO4 produced by subjecting the liquid 179 
digestate to struvite precipitation and ammonia stripping and absorption processes, but their 180 
maximum gate prices were calculated as the product of their nitrogen and phosphorus content and 181 
the market values of the industrially synthesized (NH4)2SO435 and (NH4)2HPO4,36 expressed per kg of 182 
nitrogen and phosphorus, respectively.  183 
 184 
The capital costs of the unit processes available in the current Cantabrian waste management plant 185 
(differentiated in Figure 1 with a discontinuous line) and the costs associated with the farmers’ 186 
equipment and land were assumed to be already amortized. The capital costs of the other unit 187 
processes were annualized considering an amortization period of 15 years and a 7% interest rate, 188 




A previous study suggested that the GWI related to infrastructure do not constitute a significant 191 
fraction of the total GWI of waste management systems,38 and therefore the GWI of the capital 192 
goods were excluded from the analysis.   193 
 194 
Another weakness of the model is that DNDC considers that all the phosphorus contained in the 195 
organic fertilizers is in a mineral form that the crops can easily take up. Although this is a common 196 
supposition,39 certain studies pinpoint that the products recovered from municipal organic waste 197 
contain small amounts of organic phosphorus.40-42  198 
 199 
 200 
- Game theoretical model 201 
 202 
The Stackelberg game is a sequential game model that makes a distinction between two types of 203 
non-cooperative players – the leader and the followers – who do not coordinate their strategies and 204 
only seek to optimize their own performance. The leader has the strategic advantage of making the 205 
initial decisions knowing how the followers will respond.43 The Stackelberg game reflects the 206 
hierarchical relationships between leaders and followers, and thus it was applied to model the case 207 
study; the waste managers were identified as the leaders, who determine the quantities and prices 208 
of the produced organic fertilizers, and the farmers, as the followers who decide which product to 209 
purchase among the fertilizers available in the market. The waste managers must anticipate that, 210 
given the choice between alternative fertilizing products that provide the same function, the 211 
farmers will acquire the ones with the lowest associated costs.  212 
 213 
 214 
Optimization method 215 
 216 
The Stackelberg game was formulated as a bilevel optimization problem, in which the upper level 217 
problem corresponds to the leader’s problem, and the nested lower level problem, to the followers’ 218 
problem.44 To solve the bilevel problem, it was reformulated into a single-level problem by means 219 
of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which – provided that the lower level problem is convex – 220 
transform the lower level problem into a set of constraints appended to the upper level problem.45 221 
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If the problem included discrete lower level variables, a more complex reformulation algorithm 222 
would be required.46,47 Reformulating the bilevel problem allows the upper and lower level 223 
problems to be solved concurrently to attain a Nash equilibrium where none of the players can 224 
improve their performance by unilaterally changing their actions; i.e., each player adopts the 225 
strategies that optimize their objectives given the actions taken by the other players.43  226 
 227 
Although the minimization of the GWI of the entire system entails decisions in the upper and lower 228 
level problems, given the limited information that the followers have access to, and their more 229 
restricted decision-making power, the environmental objective function was considered as one of 230 
the leader’s goals.48 To simultaneously optimize the leader’s environmental and economic 231 
objectives, a multi-objective optimization approach was adopted. Following the ε-constraint 232 
method,49 a set of Pareto-efficient solutions – all of which are better than the others in at least one 233 
criterion – was obtained.  234 
 235 
 236 
PROBLEM STATEMENT 237 
 238 
The reformulated single level problem – a single period mixed integer linear program composed of 239 
345,234 constraints, 148,470 continuous variables and 1,597 binary variables – was solved with the 240 
CPLEX algorithm50 in an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU-4500U of 1.8 GHz and 8 GB of RAM. Setting the 241 
absolute optimality tolerance to 0, the computational time varied between 40 minutes and 27 242 
hours, depending on the selected scenario and the defined constraints.  243 
 244 
 245 
Upper level problem 246 
 247 
The leader’s profits were calculated as the sum of the annual revenues from the sale of organic 248 
fertilizers and the waste management tax paid by the municipalities minus the Total Annual Costs 249 
(TAC) of the waste management subsystem. To maximize the waste managers’ profits and minimize 250 
the total GWI of the CIWMS, the leaders must make decisions on the configuration of the waste 251 




The optimal design of the waste management subsystem is determined by the binary variables that 254 
indicate which unit processes integrate this subsystem and the continuous variables that reflect the 255 
amount of waste that each unit process handles. As Figure 1 illustrates, only the municipal organic 256 
waste that has been source separated is allowed into the solid waste recycling processes (wet 257 
thermophilic anaerobic digestion and tunnel or windrow composting); the organic waste that has 258 
been mixed with inorganic materials must be sent to the landfill or the grate incinerator, along with 259 
the solid rejects of the other unit processes. Hence, the Source Separation Rate (SSR) – the fraction 260 
of municipal organic waste that is source separated – was identified as one of the leader’s decision 261 
variables. 262 
 263 
The price of the organic fertilizers was defined as an upper level decision variable that equates the 264 
sum of the product of a matrix of binary variables (𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟) and a matrix of parameters within the 265 
predefined range of gate prices (𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟). This formulation allowed us to apply Glover’s method51 to 266 
linearize the product of a continuous and a binary variable, ensuring that that the solutions to the 267 
optimization problem are global optimums. 268 
 269 
The system model relies on the assumption that all the produced organic fertilizers are sold to the 270 
regional farmers. This equation limits the amount of produced organic fertilizers (upper level 271 
variable) to the total amount of organic fertilizers purchased by the farmers (lower level variable), 272 
which is in turn restricted by the fertilization requirements of the regionally grown corn and wheat, 273 
quantified in the lower level problem. Nevertheless, the mass balance that connects the waste 274 
management and agricultural subsystems constitutes an upper level constraint because the waste 275 
managers are the stakeholders in control of the production and sale operations. In addition to the 276 
mass and energy balances that describe the waste management subsystem, the upper level problem 277 
must satisfy these constraints: 278 
• The waste managers’ profits must be positive.  279 
• Different types of composting processes cannot be concurrently integrated into the system. 280 
• Capacity restrictions. The minimal and maximal capacity restrictions of the waste management 281 
unit processes are shown in Table S47 of the Supporting Information. The minimal capacity 282 
restrictions were set as a requisite for the construction of new infrastructure to avoid the 283 
nonlinearities derived from the exponential equations that quantify how the TAC of the waste 284 
management unit processes decrease as the annual waste flows that they handle increase.52-57 285 
11 
 
These restrictions enabled us to assume that the incremental changes in the TAC with the 286 
incoming waste flows are constant. The validity of this assumption was investigated in Figures 287 
S10-S19, which compare the TAC considered in this study with the TAC exponential curves 288 
provided in the literature.55,57  289 
• New waste management unit processes with the same function as those already present in the 290 
Cantabrian waste management plant can only be implemented if the capacities of the previous 291 
ones are exceeded.  292 
• In accordance with Directive 1999/31/EC,58 the amount of landfilled biodegradable waste is 293 
limited to 35% of the total biodegradable municipal solid waste produced in 1995. 294 
 295 
 296 
Lower level problem 297 
 298 
The followers, who aim at maximizing their annual profits by reacting rationally to the leader’s 299 
decisions, are the regional farmers that cultivate corn and wheat. Each farmer is characterized by 300 
their geographic location, the type of cereal they grow and the area they have available for crop 301 
production. A total of 63 followers were identified, only three of whom harvest wheat. Appendix E 302 
compiles the data that describe the farmers’ activities, including the road distances from the 303 
agricultural sites to the waste management plant and to the two closest fertilizer plants, which are 304 
assumed to supply all the industrial fertilizers.   305 
 306 
The amount and type of fertilizers purchased by each farmer depend on the chosen fertilization 307 
strategy. To account for the fact that the nitrogen/phosphorus ratio in the organic fertilizers 308 
(excluding (NH4)2SO4) is lower than the proportion of these nutrients required by corn and wheat, 309 
three fertilization strategies were defined:  310 
1. Application of industrial fertilizers (NH4NO3 and (NH4)2HPO4) to satisfy the crop demand for 311 
nitrogen and phosphorus. Farmers acquire these products from the nearest fertilizer plant to 312 
their fields. 313 
2. Application of organic fertilizers to cover the crop nitrogen requirements. This strategy leads to 314 




3. Application of organic fertilizers to supply the phosphorus needed by the crop. To correct the 317 
nitrogen deficiency, NH4NO3 is provided.  318 
 319 
The followers’ decisions are reflected by variable 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠, which was defined as the amount of each 320 
type of fertilizer purchased by each farmer and applied to the soil in accordance with each 321 
fertilization strategy. The other variables and parameters involved in the lower level problem are 322 
described in the nomenclature section. 323 
 324 
The lower level problem was formulated as follows:  325 










∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · �𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝜖𝜖 · 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
� · 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 − (𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 · 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 + 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠) · 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 
 
(1) 
𝑠𝑠. 𝑡𝑡.  ℎ1(𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚) ≡ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 −��
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠







− ���𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑉𝑉𝑥𝑥𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝
� · (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚) = 0 
 
(3) 
𝑔𝑔1�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠,,𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟 ,𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚� ≡ 






∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · �𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝜖𝜖 · 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
· 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 
−𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 · (��𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 · 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · �𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚�
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝
) ≤ 0   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
 
(4) 
𝑔𝑔2�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚� ≡ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 ≤ 0  ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
 
(5) 
𝑔𝑔3�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠� ≡ 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 − 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 · 𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≤ 0    ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠 
 
(6) 
𝑔𝑔4�𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠� ≡ −𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≤ 0  ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠 (7) 
 326 
The objective function was calculated as the annual revenues from the sale of grain minus the 327 
annual costs associated with fertilization (including the transportation and spreading of fertilizers), 328 




Constraints  ℎ1 and ℎ2 express that the total surface fertilized by the farmers must equal the area of 331 
their respective fields. Constraint 𝑔𝑔1 captures the behavior of the followers in the Stackelberg game: 332 
if the cost of purchasing, transporting and spreading a given amount of organic fertilizers exceeds 333 
the cost of fertilizing the equivalent area with industrial fertilizers, the farmers will fertilize their 334 
fields solely with industrial fertilizers. Finally, constraints 𝑔𝑔2 to 𝑔𝑔4 indicate the upper and lower 335 
bounds of the lower level variables. 336 
 337 
 338 
- Reformulation of the lower level problem  339 
 340 
The leaders make their decisions prior to the followers, which allows the binary upper level variables 341 
that appear in the lower level problem (𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟) to be treated as parameters.43,45 In the absence of 342 
discrete variables, the lower level problem can be replaced by its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, 343 
which are composed of:  344 
• Primal feasibility constraints. These are the lower level constraints: ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑔𝑔1, 𝑔𝑔2, 𝑔𝑔3 and 𝑔𝑔4. 345 
• Dual feasibility constraints. They are based on the derivatives of the lower level functions with 346 
respect to the lower level variables: 347 
(𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 · 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 − ∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · �𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝜖𝜖 + 𝑣𝑣𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝 · µ1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚) · 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
 
−��𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟 · 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟 + 𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚
𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
− 𝑣𝑣𝑥𝑥𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝 · µ2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚� · 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 
(8) 
−���𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟 · 𝑦𝑦𝑝𝑝,𝑟𝑟 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑚
𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟
� +
∑ 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑐𝑐,𝑓𝑓,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · �𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚�𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝜖𝜖
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠
� · 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑝 · 𝜆𝜆1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 
−𝜆𝜆3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≤ 0 
 
µ1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 + ��𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑉𝑉𝑥𝑥𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠,𝑝𝑝
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝
· µ2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 
−��𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑉𝑉𝑌𝑌𝑉𝑉𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝 · 𝑂𝑂𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · �𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 · 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚� ·
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑝
𝜆𝜆1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 = 0 
(9) 
 348 
The domains of the auxiliary variables used to formulate the dual feasibility constraints are 349 
defined below:  350 
  µ1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 𝜖𝜖 ℝ  351 
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          µ2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 𝜖𝜖 ℝ 352
𝜆𝜆1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
 
(10) 
𝜆𝜆2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
 
(11) 
𝜆𝜆3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0  ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠 (12) 
 353 
• Complementary slackness constraints. They indicate that the product of the left-hand side of 354 
the inequalities that compose the lower level problem and their associated dual variables must 355 
equal 0:  356 
𝜆𝜆1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 · 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 = 0 
 
(13) 
𝜆𝜆2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 · 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 = 0 
 
(14) 
𝜆𝜆3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 = 0 
 
(15) 
𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 = 0   (16) 
 357 
Each complementary nonlinear slackness constraint was replaced by two equivalent linear 358 
constraints using binary variables and a sufficiently large (or big-M) parameter: 359 
𝜆𝜆1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑦𝑦1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚  
 
(17) 
−𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 ≤ �1 − 𝑦𝑦1𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚� · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
 
(18) 
𝜆𝜆2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 ≤ 𝑦𝑦2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
 
(19) 
−𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚 ≤ �1 − 𝑦𝑦2𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚� · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚 
 
(20) 
𝜆𝜆3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑦𝑦3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠 
 
(21) 
−𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑔𝑔3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≤ �1 − 𝑦𝑦3𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠� · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠 
 
(22) 
𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑦𝑦4𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠 
 
(23) 
−𝑌𝑌ℎ𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠 ≤ �1 − 𝑦𝑦4𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠� · 𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑝𝑝,𝑠𝑠   ∀ 𝑠𝑠,𝑚𝑚, 𝑝𝑝, 𝑠𝑠 
 
(24) 
  360 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 361 
 362 
Before proceeding with the multi-objective optimization, the objective functions of the 363 
reformulated single-level problem were separately optimized. The maximal profits that the waste 364 
managers can earn, and the resulting GWI are represented in Figures 2A and 2C, whereas the profits 365 
they would make if their only objective was to attain the minimal GWI (shown in Figure 2D) are 366 
displayed in Figure 2B. In order to ascertain the influence of the uncertainty associated with the 367 
behavior of the citizens responsible for waste generation and separation on the results, the single 368 
objective optimization problems were solved for five SSR intervals (0≤SSR≤0.1, 0.1≤SSR≤0.2, 369 
0.2≤SSR≤0.3, 0.3≤SSR≤0.4, 0.4≤SSR≤0.5); i.e., an optimal SSR was obtained for each interval. 370 
 371 
Figures 2A and 2B prove that, regardless of the SSR, the revenues derived from the sale of organic 372 
fertilizers are negligible with respect to the waste management tax. Moreover, the costs related to 373 
the collection and recycling of the source separated waste increase with the SSR, but the 374 
incineration and landfilling costs are reduced. 375 
 376 
The trade-off between the GWI of the waste management and agricultural subsystems is evidenced 377 
in Figures 2C and 2D. In general, as the SSR increases, the agricultural subsystem is responsible for 378 
more GWI because of the greater emissions associated with the transportation, spreading and soil 379 
application of the larger mass of organic fertilizers required to fulfill the fertilization needs compared 380 
with industrial fertilizers. Nonetheless, the GWI of the waste management subsystem decrease with 381 
the SSR because more waste can be processed by the anaerobic digestion and composting 382 
technologies instead of incinerated or landfilled 383 
 384 
Thus, as Figures 2A and 2D illustrate, the relationship between the SSRs and the optimal economic 385 
and environmental objectives could be described with a curve; the optimal profits and GWI are 386 
attained with the median SSR (0.25). However, that does not imply that the economic and 387 
environmental objectives follow the same trend. Figure 2B shows that the waste managers’ profits 388 
would drop to nearly 0 if they only pursued a reduction in the GWI. These results provide grounds 389 




Figure 2. Results of the single-objective optimizations of the leader’s objective functions in the reformulated single-level problem for the defined 392 
SSR intervals 393 
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Figure 3A depicts the Pareto fronts and the prices of the organic fertilizers obtained for two 394 
scenarios: i) the decentralized scenario described by the bilevel problem, and ii) a centralized 395 
scenario wherein the farmers’ economic interests are disregarded. The latter was optimized solving 396 
the upper level problem subject to the restrictions of the lower level problem. Both Pareto fronts 397 
confirm that the optimal SSR range is 0.2-0.3, and that the improvement in the GWI is accomplished 398 
at the expense of the waste managers’ profits. The amount of digestate produced is progressively 399 
reduced as the restriction on the GWI is relaxed, allowing the waste managers to increase their 400 
profits. 401 
 402 
The balance between the farmers’ and waste managers’ economic interests in the decentralized 403 
scenario is reflected in the lower prices set for the organic fertilizers (0-2 €·metric ton-1 of compost, 404 
and 0-1 €·metric ton-1 of digestate), whereas in the centralized scenario the waste managers set the 405 
maximum prices allowed by the restrictions of the lower level problem. The results of the 406 
decentralized scenario are more consistent with the symbolic prices that European farmers usually 407 
pay for organic fertilizers.32-34 The digestate is assigned lower prices than compost to compensate 408 
for the larger mass of digestate required to achieve the same fertilizing function, and therefore the 409 
digestate transportation and spreading costs are higher than those of compost. 410 
 411 
The farmers’ better economic performance in the decentralized scenario is accompanied by a 412 
reduction in the waste managers’ profits and increased GWI with respect to the centralized scenario. 413 
This happens because the solutions to the bilevel problem rely to a greater extent on the use of the 414 
organic fertilizers to cover the crops’ phosphorus requirements, which reduces the amount of 415 
(NH4)2HPO4 needed. This fertilization strategy is based on the application of NH4NO3, a fertilizer that 416 
is less expensive than (NH4)2HPO4, but also has a higher carbon footprint. Nevertheless, as Figure 3A 417 
shows, the relative differences between the leader’s economic and environmental objectives in 418 
both scenarios are not remarkable. This can be attributed to the small fraction of the revenues due 419 
to the sale of organic fertilizers, and to the low contribution of the agricultural subsystem to the 420 




Figure 3. Pareto fronts and prices of the organic fertilizers for the analyzed scenarios 423 
 424 
Figures 2 and 3A show that the waste managers’ margin for profits and environmental improvement 425 
are quite slight. However, the decision-makers can push the Pareto frontier changing some of the 426 
fixed operating decisions that act as model parameters. Since the waste management tax is the main 427 
source of income to the waste managers and hence it will determine the feasibility of the CIWMS, a 428 
sensitivity analysis considering increases of 25% and 50% in the current waste management tax was 429 




Raising the waste management tax could bring about reductions of up to 19% in the GWI, which are 432 
significant compared with the maximal 11% reduction that can be achieved with the current tax. 433 
The reason is that the minimal GWI are no longer limited by the restriction on the minimal profits 434 
that the waste managers must make. The rise in the revenues allows the waste managers to 435 
implement larger SSRs; the scenarios with the increased waste management taxes attain the 436 
minimal GWI based on a 49% SSR, the valorization of all the source separated organic waste in the 437 
anaerobic digester, and the ammonia stripping and absorption of the liquid digestate, which enables 438 
the sale of (NH4)2SO4 for prices between 29 and 43 €·metric ton-1. However, the optimal SSR the 439 
waste managers should implement to maximize their profits irrespective of the tax is 25%. 440 
 441 
The results of Figure 4 – which indicates the geographic location of the regional farmers and the 442 
type of organic fertilizers they purchase –correspond to the Pareto optimal solutions that generate 443 
54x106 kg CO2-eq·year-1 in the decentralized scenario. For all the analyzed waste management taxes, 444 
the farmers that purchase the organic fertilizers are located within a 32 km radius around the waste 445 
management plant; the farmers located further away opt to purchase industrial fertilizers to reduce 446 
the transportation costs. In the scenario with the highest waste management tax, struvite is 447 
produced at a price of 58.49 €·metric ton-1. Struvite is the fertilizer sent to the farthest agricultural 448 
site because of the lower amount of product required to fertilize the same area relative to the other 449 
organic fertilizers. 450 
 451 
The individualized recommendations that can be made to the farmers and the waste managers 452 
based on these results prove that the integration of life cycle and game theoretical models 453 
constitutes an improvement with respect to the existing centralized life cycle optimization 454 
frameworks.  455 


















Figure 4. Distribution of organic fertilizers between the Cantabrian farmers for the Pareto 472 
solutions that generate 54x106 kg CO2-eq·year-1 in the decentralized scenarios with increased 473 
taxes. The size of the blank circles is proportional to the area of the field, and the size of the 474 





The proposed optimization framework allows the analysis of the environmental and economic 478 
consequences of the adoption of a circular economy through the lens of all the stakeholders, and 479 
the simultaneous optimization of their decisions in accordance with their conflicting objectives.  480 
 481 
The results demonstrate that a deviation from the objective of economic growth – understood as 482 
an increase in profits – is needed to achieve a reduction in the GWI. To improve the competitiveness 483 
of the organic fertilizers in the market, their prices must be set quite low with respect to the 484 
industrially produced fertilizers. Therefore, the sale of organic fertilizers constitutes an insignificant 485 
source of revenues for the waste managers; without economic incentives that spur the investment 486 
in novel technologies, it is unlikely that waste managers will change their mindset and start viewing 487 
organic wastes as valuable products.  488 
 489 
Moreover, an 11% reduction in the GWI of the system can be achieved at most with the current 490 
waste management tax, which suggests that the implementation of a circular economy is not the 491 
most effective strategy to combat climate change.  492 
 493 
Although these results cannot be extrapolated to other case studies, the developed framework can 494 
be adapted to different systems. Future studies should model the behavior of the agents that 495 
generate waste, who determine the amount of waste that is source separated and will be affected 496 
by the changes in the waste management tax and the cost of staples. 497 
 498 
The further improvements and deployment of this framework could bridge the gap between the 499 
theoretical concept of a circular economy and its industrial applications, helping policy-makers 500 





CIWMS Circular Integrated Waste Management System 
GWI Global Warming Impacts 
LCA Life Cycle Assessment 
SSR  Source Separation Rate 






C crops 509 
F Industrial fertilizers 510 
M Municipalities 511 
P Fertilizers 512 
R Prices of the organic fertilizers 513 
S Fertilization strategies 514 
 515 
Upper level variable 516 
yp,r Binary decision on the price of the organic fertilizers  517 
 518 
Lower level variables 519 
Aorgc,m,p,s Area fertilized with the organic fertilizers (ha) 520 
TFCc,m,p,s Total costs related to the purchase, transportation and spreading of the fertilizers (€·ha-1) 521 
xfc,m,p,s Amount of each fertilizing product purchased by each follower and applied to the soil in 522 
accordance with each fertilization strategy (kg) 523 
 524 
Reformulation variables 525 
µ1c,m, µ2c,m, λ1c,m , λ2c,m, λ3c,m,p,s Continuous variable used to define the dual feasibility constraints  526 
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Gr,c,m,p,s Auxiliary variable used to apply Glover’s linearization method and equal to the product of 527 
xfc,m,p,s and yp,r 528 
lhsdfcxc,m,p,s Left-hand side of the dual feasibility constraint based on the derivatives with respect to 529 
xfc,m,p,s 530 
lhsg1c,m, lhsg2c,m, lhsg3c,m,p,s Left-hand side of constraints g1-g3  531 
Y1c,m, Y2c,m, Y3c,m,p,s , Y4c,m,p,s  Binary variables used for the linearization of the complementary 532 
slackness constraints  533 
 534 
Parameters 535 
Atc,m Total fertilized area (ha) 536 
CFc,f,p,s Amount of industrial fertilizers required to complement the fertilization of 1 ha with organic 537 
fertilizers (kg·ha-1)   538 
CFPf Gate price of industrial fertilizers (€·kg-1)  539 
CPc Crop price (€·metric ton-1)  540 
Dfm Distance from the industrial fertilizer plant to the fields (km) 541 
Dpm,p Distance from the fertilizer production sites to the fields (km) 542 
FPp,r Gate price of fertilizers (€·kg-1)  543 
IFPc,p Average gate price of the industrial fertilizers required to fertilize each crop (€·kg-1)  544 
lc Labor costs (€·ha-1) 545 
Mc,m Matrix of large parameters  546 
Mc,m,p, Mc,m,p,s Tensors of large parameters  547 
Oc,m,p,s Tensor of zeros and ones indicating the possible combinations of c, m, p and s 548 
Pc,p,s Amount of fertilizers required to fertilize 1 ha (kg·ha-1)  549 
sc Spreading costs (€·kg-1)  550 
tc Transportation costs (€·kg-1·km-1) 551 
TCFCc,m,p,s Total costs related to the purchase, transportation and spreading of the industrial 552 
fertilizers required to complement the fertilization of 1 ha with organic fertilizers (€·ha-1) 553 
Vfertp,s Matrix of ones and zeros indicating the selection of industrial fertilizers 554 
Vindp Vector of ones and zeros indicating the selection of the industrial fertilizers 555 
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Vorgp Vector of ones and zeros indicating the selection of the organic fertilizers 556 
wc Water requirements (m3·ha-1)  557 
wc Water costs (€·m-3)  558 
Yieldc,p,s Crop yield (metric ton·ha-1) 559 
 560 
 561 
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